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Abstract. Shield synthesis is an approach to enforce a set of safety-critical prop-
erties of a reactive system at runtime. A shield monitors the system and corrects
any erroneous output values instantaneously. The shield deviates from the given
outputs as little as it can and recovers to hand back control to the system as soon
as possible. This paper takes its inspiration from a case study on mission plan-
ning for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in which k-stabilizing shields, which
guarantee recovery in a finite time, could not be constructed. We introduce the
notion of admissible shields, which improves k-stabilizing shields in two ways:
(1) whereas k-stabilizing shields take an adversarial view on the system, admissi-
ble shields take a collaborative view. That is, if there is no shield that guarantees
recovery within k steps regardless of system behavior, the admissible shield will
attempt to work with the system to recover as soon as possible. (2) Admissible
shields can handle system failures during the recovery phase. In our experimental
results we show that for UAVs, we can generate admissible shields, even when
k-stabilizing shields do not exist.
1 Introduction
Technological advances enable the development of increasingly sophisticated systems.
Smaller and faster microprocessors, wireless networking, and new theoretical results in
areas such as machine learning and intelligent control are paving the way for transfor-
mative technologies across a variety of domains – self-driving cars that have the po-
tential to reduce accidents, traffic, energy consumption, and pollution; and unmanned
systems that can safely and efficiently operate on land, under water, in the air, and
in space. However, in each of these domains, concerns about safety are being raised
[16],[7]. Specifically, there is a concern that due to the complexity of such systems,
traditional test and evaluation approaches will not be sufficient for finding errors, and
alternative approaches such as those provided by formal methods are needed [17].
Formal methods are often used to verify systems at design time, but this is not al-
ways realistic. Some systems are simply too large to be fully verified. Others, especially
systems that operate in rich dynamic environments or those that continuously adapt their
behavior through methods such as machine learning, cannot be fully modeled at design
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2time. Still others may incorporate components that have not been previously verified
and cannot be modeled, e.g., proprietary components or pre-compiled code libraries.
Also, even systems that have been fully verified at design time may be subject to ex-
ternal faults such as those introduced by unexpected hardware failures or human inputs.
One way to address this issue is to model nondeterministic behaviours (such as faults)
as disturbances, and verify the system with respect to this disturbance model [18]. How-
ever, it is impossible to model all potential unexpected behavior at design time.
An alternative in such cases is to perform runtime verification to detect violations
of a set of specified properties while a system is executing [14]. An extension of this
idea is to perform runtime enforcement of specified properties, in which violations are
not only detected but also overwritten in a way that specified properties are maintained.
A general approach for runtime enforcement of specified properties is shield syn-
thesis, in which a shield monitors the system and instantaneously overwrites incorrect
outputs. A shield must ensure both correctness, i.e., it corrects system outputs such that
all properties are always satisfied, as well as minimum deviation, i.e., it deviates from
system outputs only if necessary and as rarely as possible. The latter requirement is
important because the system may satisfy additional noncritical properties that are not
considered by the shield but should be retained as much as possible.
Bloem et al. [4] proposed the notion of k-stabilizing shields. Since we are given
a safety specification, we can identify wrong outputs, that is, outputs after which the
specification is violated (more precisely: after which the environment can force the
specification to be violated). A wrong trace is then a trace that ends in a wrong out-
put. The idea of shields is that they may modify the outputs so that the specification
always holds, but that such deviations last for at most k consecutive steps after a wrong
output. If a second violation happens during the k-step recovery phase, the shield en-
ters a mode where it only enforces correctness, but no longer minimizes the deviation.
This proposed approach has two limitations with significant impact in practice. (1) The
k-stabilizing shield synthesis problem is unrealizable for many safety-critical systems,
because a finite number of deviations cannot be guaranteed. (2) k-stabilizing shields
make the assumption that there are no further system errors during the recovery phase.
In this paper, we introduce admissible shields, which overcome the two issues of
k-stabilizing shields. To address shortcoming (1), we guarantee the following: (a) Ad-
missible shields are subgame optimal. That is, for any wrong trace, if there is a finite
number k of steps within which the recovery phase can be guaranteed to end, the shield
will always achieve this. (b) The shield is admissible, that is, if there is no such number
k, it always picks a deviation that is optimal in that it ends the recovery phase as soon
as possible for some possible future inputs. (This is defined in more detail below.) As
a result, admissible shields work well in settings in which finite recovery can not be
guaranteed, because they guarantee correctness and may well end the recovery period
if the system does not pick adversarial outputs. To address shortcoming (2), admissible
shields allow arbitrary failure frequencies and in particular failures that arrive during
recovery, without losing the ability to recover.
As a second contribution, we demonstrate the use of admissible shields through a
case study involving mission planning for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Manually
creating and executing mission plans that meet mission objectives while addressing all
3possible contingencies is a complex and error-prone task. Therefore, having a shield that
changes the mission only if absolutely necessary to enforce certain safety properties has
the potential to lower the burden on human operators, and ensures safety during mission
execution. We show that admissible shields are applicable in this setting, whereas k-
stabilizing shields are not.
Related Work: Our work builds on synthesis of reactive systems [20], [3] and reac-
tive mission plans [9] from formal specifications, and our method is related to synthesis
of robust [1] and error-resilient [10] systems. However, our approach differs in that we
do not synthesize an entire system, but rather a shield that considers only a small set
of properties and corrects the output of the system at runtime. Li et al. [15] focused
on the problem of synthesizing a semi-autonomous controller that expects occasional
human intervention for correct operation. A human-in-the-loop controller monitors past
and current information about the system and its environment. The controller invokes
the human operator only when it is necessary, but as soon as a specification is violated
ahead of time, such that the human operator has sufficient time to respond. Similarly,
our shields monitor the behavior of systems at run time, and interfere as little as pos-
sible. Our work relates to more general work on runtime enforcement of properties
[12], but shield synthesis [4] is the first appropriative work for reactive systems, since
shields act on erroneous system outputs immediately without delay. While [4] focuses
on shield synthesis for systems assumed to make no more than one error every k steps,
this work assumes only that systems generally have cooperative behavior with respect
to the shield, i.e., the shield ensures a finite number of deviations if the system chooses
certain outputs. This is similar in concept to cooperative synthesis as considered in [2],
in which a synthesized system has to satisfy a set of properties (called guarantees) only
if certain environment assumptions hold. The authors present a synthesis procedure that
maximizes the cooperation between system and environment for satisfying both guar-
antees and assumptions as far as possible.
Outline: In what follows, we begin in Section 2 by motivating the need for admis-
sible shields through a case study involving mission planning for a UAV. In Sections
3, 4, 5, we define preliminary concepts, review the general shield synthesis framework,
and describe our approach for synthesizing admissible shields. Section 6 provides ex-
perimental results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivating Example
In this section, we apply shields on a scenario in which a UAV must maintain certain
properties while performing a surveillance mission in a dynamic environment. We show
how a shield can be used to enforce the desired properties, where a human operator in
conjunction with a lower-level autonomous planner is considered as the reactive system
that sends commands to the UAV’s autopilot. We discuss how we would intuitively want
a shield to behave in such a situation. We show that the admissible shields provide the
desired behaviors and address the limitations of k-stabilizing shields.
To begin, note that a common UAV control architecture consists of a ground control
station that communicates with an autopilot onboard the UAV [5]. The ground control
station receives and displays updates from the autopilot on the UAV’s state, including
4position, heading, airspeed, battery level, and sensor imagery. It can also send com-
mands to the UAV’s autopilot, such as waypoints to fly to. A human operator can then
use the ground control station to plan waypoint-based routes for the UAV, possibly mak-
ing modifications during mission execution to respond to events observed through the
UAV’s sensors. However, mission planning and execution can be very workload inten-
sive, especially when operators are expected to control multiple UAVs simultaneously
[8]. To address this issue, methods for UAV command and control have been explored
in which operators issue high-level commands, and automation carries out low-level
execution details.
Several errors can occur in this type of human-automation paradigm [6]. For in-
stance, in issuing high-level commands to the low-level planner, a human operator
might neglect required safety properties due to high workload, fatigue, or an incom-
plete understanding of exactly how the autonomous planner might execute the com-
mand. The planner might also neglect these safety properties either because of software
errors or by design. Waypoint commands issued by the operator or planner could also
be corrupted by software that translates waypoint messages between ground station and
autopilot specific formats or during transmission over the communication link.
As the mission unfolds, waypoint commands will be sent periodically to the au-
topilot. If a waypoint that violates the properties is received, a shield that monitors the
system inputs and can overwrite the waypoint outputs to the autopilot would be able to
make corrections to ensure the satisfaction of the desired properties.
Consider the mission map in Fig. 1 [13], which contains three tall buildings (illus-
trated as blue blocks), over which a UAV should not attempt to fly. It also includes two
unattended ground sensors (UGS) that provide data on possible nearby targets, one at
location loc1 and one at locx, as well as two locations of interest, locy and locz. The UAV
can monitor locx, locy, and locz from several nearby vantage points. The map also con-
tains a restricted operating zone (ROZ), illustrated with a red box, in which flight might
be dangerous, and the path of a possible adversary that should be avoided (the pink
dashed line). Inside the communication relay region (large green area), communication
links are highly reliable. Outside this region, communication relies on relay points with
lower reliability. Given this scenario, properties of interest include:
1. Connected waypoints. The UAV is only allowed to fly to directly connected way-
points.
2. No communication. The UAV is not allowed to stay in a location with reduced
communication reliability.
3. Restricted operating zones. The UAV has to leave a ROZ within 2 time steps.
4. Detected by an adversary. Locations on the adversary’s path cannot be visited
more than once over any window of 3 time steps.
5. UGS. If a UGS reports a possible nearby target, the UAV should visit a respective
waypoint within 7 steps (for UGS1 visit loc1, for UGS2 visit loc5, loc6, loc7, or loc8).
6. Go home. Once the UAV’s battery is low, it should return to a designated landing
site at loc14 within 10 time steps.
The task of the shield is to ensure these properties during operation. In this setting,
the operator in conjunction with a lower-level planner acts as a reactive system that
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Fig. 1: A map for UAV mission planning.
responds to mission-relevant inputs; in this case data from the UGSs and a signal indi-
cating whether the battery is low. In each step, the next waypoint is sent to the autopilot,
which is encoded in a bit representation via outputs l4, l3, l2, and l1. We attach the shield
as shown in Fig. 2. The shield monitors mission inputs and waypoint outputs, correcting
outputs immediately if a violation of the safety properties becomes unavoidable.
We represent each of the properties by a safety automaton, the product of which
serves as the shield specification. Fig. 3 models the “connected waypoints” property,
where each state represents a waypoint with the same number. Edges are labeled by the
values of the variables l4 . . . l1. For example, the edge leading from state s5 to state s6 is
labeled by ¬l4l3l2¬l1. For clarity, we drop the labels of edges in Fig. 3. The automaton
also includes an error state, which is not shown. Missing edges lead to this error state,
denoting forbidden situations.
How should a shield behave in this scenario? If the human operator wants to moni-
tor a location in a ROZ, he or she would like to simply command the UAV to “monitor
the location in the ROZ and stay there”, with the planner handling the execution details.
If the planner cannot do this while meeting all the safety properties, it is appropriate
for the shield to revise its outputs. Yet, the operator would still expect his or her com-
mands to be followed to the maximum extent possible, leaving the ROZ when necessary
and returning whenever possible. Thus, the shield should minimize deviations from the
operator’s directives as executed by the planner.
Using a k-stabilizing shield. As a concrete example, assume the UAV is currently at
loc3, and the operator commands it to monitor loc12. The planner then sends commands
to fly to loc11 then loc12, which are accepted by the shield. The planner then sends a
command to loiter at loc12, but the shield must overwrite it to maintain Property 3,
which requires the UAV to leave the ROZ within two time steps. The shield instead
commands the UAV to go to loc15. Suppose the operator then commands the UAV to
fly to loc13, while the planner is still issuing commands as if the UAV is at loc12. The
planner then commands the UAV to fly to loc13, but since the actual UAV cannot fly
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the map in Fig. 1.
from loc15 to loc13 directly, the shield directs the UAV to loc14 on its way to loc15. The
operator might then respond to a change in the mission and command the UAV fly back
to loc12, and the shield again deviates from the route assumed by the planner, and directs
the UAV back to loc15, and so on. Therefore, a single specification violation can lead to
an infinitely long deviation between the UAV’s actual position and the UAV’s assumed
position. A k-stabilizing shield is allowed to deviate from the planner’s commands for
at most k consecutive time steps. Hence, no k-stabilizing shield exists.
Using an admissible shield. Recall the situation in which the shield caused the
actual position of the UAV to “fall behind” the position assumed by the planner, so
that the next waypoint the planner issues is two or more steps away from the UAV’s
current waypoint position. The shield should then implement a best-effort strategy to
“synchronize” the UAV’s actual position with that assumed by the planner. Though this
cannot be guaranteed, the operator and planner are not adversarial towards the shield,
so it will likely be possible to achieve this re-synchronization, for instance when the
UAV goes back to a previous waypoint or remains at the current waypoint for several
steps. This possibility motivates the concept of an admissible shield. Assume that the
actual position of the UAV is loc14 and the its assumed position is loc13. If the operator
commands the UAV to loiter at loc13, the shield will be able to catch up with the state
assumed by the planner and to end the deviation by the next specification violation.
3 Preliminaries
We denote the Boolean domain by B = {true, false}, the set of natural numbers by
N, and abbreviate N ∪ {∞} by N∞. We consider a reactive system with a finite set
I = {i1, . . . , im} of Boolean inputs and a finite set O = {o1, . . . , on} of Boolean outputs.
The input alphabet is ΣI = 2I, the output alphabet is ΣO = 2O, and Σ = ΣI × ΣO. The
set of finite (infinite) words over Σ is denoted by Σ∗ (Σω), and Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪ Σω. We will
also refer to words as (execution) traces. We write |σ| for the length of a trace σ ∈ Σ∗.
For σI = x0x1 . . . ∈ Σ∞I and σO = y0y1 . . . ∈ Σ∞O , we write σI ||σO for the composition
(x0, y0)(x1, y1) . . . ∈ Σ∞. A set L ⊆ Σ∞ of words is called a language. We denote the
set of all languages as L = 2Σ∞ .
7Reactive Systems. A Mealy machine (reactive system, design) is a 6-tupleD = (Q, q0,
ΣI, ΣO, δ, λ), where Q is a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ : Q×ΣI → Q
is a complete transition function, and λ : Q × ΣI → ΣO is a complete output function.
Given the input trace σI = x0x1 . . . ∈ Σ∞I , the system D produces the output trace
σO = D(σI) = λ(q0, x0)λ(q1, x1) . . . ∈ Σ∞O , where qi+1 = δ(qi, xi) for all i ≥ 0. The set
of words produced byD is denoted L(D) = {σI ||σO ∈ Σ∞ | D(σI) = σO}.
Let D = (Q, q0, ΣI, ΣO, δ, λ) and D′ = (Q′, q′0, Σ, ΣO, δ′, λ′) be reactive systems.
A serial composition of D and D′ is realized if the input and output of D are fed
to D′. We denote such composition as D ◦ D′ = (Qˆ, qˆ0, ΣI, ΣO, δˆ, λˆ), where Qˆ =
Q × Q′, qˆ0 = (q0, q′0), δˆ((q, q′), σI) = (δ(q, σI), δ′(q′, (σI, λ(q, σI)))), and λˆ((q, q′), σI) =
λ′(q′, (σI, λ(q, σI))).
Specifications. A specification ϕ is a set L(ϕ) ⊆ Σ∞ of allowed traces. D realizes ϕ,
denoted by D |= ϕ, iff L(D) ⊆ L(ϕ). A specification ϕ is realizable if there exists
a design D that realizes it. A safety specification ϕs is represented by an automaton
ϕs = (Q, q0, Σ, δ, F), where Σ = ΣI ∪ ΣO, δ : Q × Σ → Q, and F ⊆ Q is a set of safe
states. The run induced by trace σ = σ0σ1 . . . ∈ Σ∞ is the state sequence q = q0q1 . . .
such that qi+1 = δ(qi, σi); the run is accepting if ∀i ≥ 0 . qi ∈ F. Trace σ (of a designD)
satisfies ϕs if the induced run is accepting. The language L(ϕs) is the set of all traces
satisfying ϕs.
Games. A (2-player, alternating) game is a tupleG = (G, g0, ΣI, ΣO, δ,win), where G is
a finite set of game states, g0 ∈ G is the initial state, δ : G×ΣI ×ΣO → G is a complete
transition function, and win : Gω → B is a winning condition. The game is played
by two players: the system and the environment. In every state g ∈ G (starting with
g0), the environment first chooses an input letter σI ∈ ΣI, and then the system chooses
some output letter σO ∈ ΣO. This defines the next state g′ = δ(g, σI, σO), and so on.
Thus, a (finite or infinite) word over Σ results in a (finite or infinite) play, a sequence
g = g0g1 . . . of game states. A play is won by the system iff win(g) is true. A safety
game defines win via a set Fs ⊆ G of safe states: win(g0g1 . . .) is true iff ∀i ≥ 0 . gi ∈ Fs,
i.e., if only safe states are visited. Let inf(g) denote the states that occur infinitely often
in g. A Bu¨chi game defines win via a set Fb ⊆ G of accepting states: win(g) is true iff
inf(g) ∩ Fb , ∅.
It is easy to transform a safety specification into a safety game such that a trace
satisfies the specification iff the corresponding play is won. Given a safety specification
ϕs. A finite trace σ ∈ Σ∗ is wrong, if the corresponding play is not won, i.e., if there is no
way for the system to guarantee that any extension of the trace satisfies the specification.
An output is called wrong, if it makes a trace wrong; i.e., given ϕs, a trace σ ∈ Σ∗ an
input σI ∈ ΣI, and an output σO ∈ ΣO, σO is wrong iff σ is not wrong, but σ · (σI, σO) is.
A deterministic (memoryless) strategy for the environment is a function ρe : G →
ΣI. A deterministic (memoryless) strategy for the system is a function ρs : G×ΣI → ΣO.
A strategy ρs is winning for the system, if for all strategies ρe of the environment the
play g that is constructed when defining the outputs using ρe and ρs satisfies win(g).
The winning region W is the set of states from which a winning strategy exists. A
strategy is cooperatively winning if there exists a strategy ρe and ρs, such that the play
g constructed by ρe and ρs satisfies win(g).
8For a Bu¨chi game G with accepting states Fb, consider a strategy ρe of the environ-
ment, a strategy ρs of the system, and a state g ∈ G. We set the distance dist(g, ρe, ρs) =
k, if the play g defined by ρe and ρs reaches from g an accepting state that occurs in-
finitely often in g in k steps. If no such state is visited, we set dist(g, ρe, ρs) = ∞. Given
two strategies ρs and ρ′s of the system, we say that ρ′s dominates ρs if: (i) for all ρe and
all g ∈ G, dist(g, ρe, ρ′s) ≤ dist(g, ρe, ρs) , and (ii) there exists ρe and g ∈ G such that
dist(g, ρe, ρ′s) < dist(g, ρe, ρs).
A strategy is admissible if there is no strategy that dominates it.
4 Admissible Shields
Bloem et al. [4] presented the general framework for shield synthesis. A shield has two
main properties: (i) For any design, a shield ensures correctness with respect to a speci-
fication. (ii) A shield ensures minimal deviation. We revisit these properties in Sec. 4.1.
The definition of minimum deviation is designed to be flexible and different notions of
minimum deviation can be realized. k-stabilizing shields represent one concrete real-
ization. In Sec. 4.2, we present a new realization of the minimum deviation property
resulting in admissible shields.
4.1 Definition of Shields
A shield reads the input and output of a design as shown in Fig. 2. We then address the
two properties, correctness and minimum deviation, to be ensured by a shield.
The Correctness Property. With correctness we refer to the property that the shield
corrects any design’s output such that a given safety specification is satisfied. Formally,
let ϕ be a safety specification and S = (Q′, q′0, Σ, ΣO, δ′, λ′) be a Mealy machine. We
say that S ensures correctness if for any design D = (Q, q0, ΣI, ΣO, δ, λ), it holds that
(D ◦ S) |= ϕ.
Since a shield must work for any design, the synthesis procedure does not need
to consider the design’s implementation. This property is crucial because the design
may be unknown or too complex to analyze. On the other hand, the design may satisfy
additional (noncritical) specifications that are not specified in ϕ but should be retained
as much as possible.
The Minimum Deviation Property. Minimum deviation requires a shield to devi-
ate only if necessary, and as infrequently as possible. To ensure minimum deviation, a
shield can only deviate from the design if a property violation becomes unavoidable.
Given a safety specification ϕ, a Mealy machine S does not deviate unnecessarily if for
any design D and any trace σI ||σO that is not wrong, we have that S(σI ||σO) = σO. In
other words, ifD does not violate ϕ, S keeps the output ofD intact.
A Mealy machine S is a shield if S ensures correctness and does not deviate un-
necessarily.
Ideally, shields end phases of deviations as soon as possible, recovering quickly.
This property leaves room for interpretation. Different types of shields differentiate on
how this property is realized.
94.2 Defining Admissible Shields
In this section we define admissible shields using their speed of recovery. We distinguish
between two situations. In states of the design in which a finite number k of deviations
can be guaranteed, an admissible shield takes an adversarial view on the design: it
guarantees recovery within k steps regardless of system behavior, for the smallest k
possible. In these states, the strategy of an admissible shield conforms to the strategy of
k-stabilizing shield. In all other states, admissible shields take a collaborative view: the
admissible shield will attempt to work with the design to recover as soon as possible.
In particular, an admissible shield plays an admissible strategy, that is, a strategy that
cannot be beaten in recovery speed if the design acts cooperatively.
We will now define admissible shields. For failures of the system that are corrected
by the shield, we consider four phases:
1. The innocent phase consisting of inputs σI and outputs σO, in which no failure
occurs; i.e., (σI ||σO) |= ϕ.
2. The misstep phase consisting of a input σI and a wrong output σO f ; i.e., (σI ||σO) ·
(σI, σO f ) 6|= ϕ.
3. The deviation phase consisting of inputs σI
′ and outputs σO′ in which the shield
is allowed to deviate, and for a correct output σOc we have (σI ||σO) · (σI, σOc) ·
(σI
′||σO′) |= ϕ.
4. The final phase consisting σI
′′ and σO′′ in which the shield does not deviate, and
(σI ||σO) · (σI, σOc) · (σI′||σO′) · (σI′′||σO′′) |= ϕ.
Adversely k-stabilizing shields have a deviation phase of length at most k.
Definition 1. A shield S adversely k-stabilizes a trace σ = σI ||σO ∈ Σ∗, if for any input
σI ∈ ΣI and any wrong output σO f ∈ ΣO, for any correct output σOc ∈ ΣO and for any
correct trace σI
′||σO′ ∈ Σk there exists a trace σO#σO# ∈ Σk+1O such that for any trace
σI
′′||σO′′ ∈ Σω such that (σI ||σO) · (σI, σOc) · (σI′||σO′) · (σI′′||σO′′) |= ϕ, we have
S(σ · (σI, σO f ) · (σI′||σO′) · (σI′′||σO′′)) = σO · σO# · σO# · σO′′
and
(σI ||σO) · (σI, σO#) · (σI′||σO#) · (σI′′||σO′′) |= ϕ.
Note that it is not always possible to adversely k-stabilize a shield for a given k or
even for any k.
Definition 2 (Adversely k-Stabilizing Shields [4]). A shieldS is adversely k-stabilizing
if it adversely k-stabilies any finite trace.
An adversely k-stabilizing shield guarantees to end deviations after at most k steps
and produces a correct trace under the assumption that the failure of the design consists
of a transmission error in the sense that the wrong letter is substituted for a correct one.
We use the term adversely to emphasize that finitely long deviations are guaranteed for
any future inputs and outputs of the design.
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Definition 3 (Adversely Subgame Optimal Shield). A shield S is adversely subgame
optimal if for any trace σ ∈ Σ∗, S adversely k−stabilizes σ and there exists no shield
that adversely l-stabilizes σ for any l < k.
An adversely subgame optimal shield S guarantees to deviate in response to an error
for at most k time steps, for the smallest k possible.
Definition 4. A shield S collaboratively k-stabilizes a trace σ = σI ||σO ∈ Σ∗, if for
any input σI ∈ ΣI and any wrong output σO f ∈ ΣO, there exists a correct output
σOc ∈ ΣO, a correct trace σI′||σO′ ∈ Σk, and a trace σO#σO# ∈ Σk+1O such that for any
trace σI
′′||σO′′ ∈ Σω such that (σI ||σO) · (σI, σOc) · (σI′||σO′) · (σI′′||σO′′) |= ϕ, we have
S(σ · (σI, σO f ) · (σI′||σO′) · (σI′′||σO′′)) = σO · σO# · σO# · σO′′
and
(σI ||σO) · (σI, σO#) · (σI′||σO#) · (σI′′||σO′′) |= ϕ.
Definition 5 (Collaborative k-Stabilizing Shield). A shield S is collaboratively k-
stabilizing if it collaboratively k-stabilizes any finite trace.
A collaborative k-stabilizing shield requires that it must be possible to end devia-
tions after k steps, for some future input and output ofD. It is not necessary that this is
possible for all future behavior ofD allowing infinitely long deviations.
Definition 6 (Collaborative Subgame Optimal Shield). A shield S is collaborative
subgame optimal if for any trace σ ∈ Σ∗, S collaboratively k−stabilizes σ and there
exists no shield that adversely l-stabilizes σ for any l < k.
Definition 7 (Admissible Shield). A shieldS is admissible if for any trace σ, whenever
there exists a k and a shield S′ such that S′ adversely k-stabilizes σ, then S adversely
k-stabilizes σ. If such a k does not exist for trace σ, then S collaboratively k-stabilizes
σ for a minimal k.
An admissible shield ends deviations whenever possible. In all states of the design
D where a finite number of deviations can be guaranteed, an admissible shield deviates
for each violation for at most k steps, for the smallest k possible. In all other states, the
shield corrects the output in such a way that there exists design’s inputs and outputs
such that deviations end after l steps, for the smallest l possible.
5 Synthesizing Admissible Shields
The flow of the synthesis procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4. Starting from a safety speci-
fication ϕ = (Q, q0, Σ, δ, F) with Σ = ΣI×ΣO, the admissible shield synthesis procedure
consists of five steps.
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Fig. 4: Outline of our admissible shield synthesis procedure.
Step 1. Constructing the Violation Monitor U. From ϕ we build the automaton
U = (U,u0, Σ, δu) to monitor property violations by the design. The goal is to identify
the latest point in time from which a specification violation can still be corrected with
a deviation by the shield. This constitutes the start of the recovery period, in which the
shield is allowed to deviate from the design. In this phase the shield monitors the design
from all states that the design could reach under the current input and a correct output.
A second violation occurs only if the next design’s output is inconsistent with all states
that are currently monitored. In case of a second violation, the shield monitors the set
of all input-enabled states that are reachable from the current set of monitored states.
The first phase of the construction of the violation monitorU considers ϕ = (Q, q0,
Σ, δ,F) as a safety game and computes its winning region W ⊆ F so that every reactive
system D |= ϕ must produce outputs such that the next state of ϕ stays in W. Only in
cases in which the next state of ϕ is outside of W the shield is allowed to interfere.
The second phase expands the state space Q to 2Q via a subset construction, with
the following rationale. If the design makes a mistake (i.e., picks outputs such that ϕ
enters a state q < W), we have to “guess” what the design actually meant to do and we
consider all output letters that would have avoided leaving W and continue monitoring
the design from all the corresponding successor states in parallel. Thus,U is essentially
a subset construction of ϕ, where a state u ∈ U ofU represents a set of states in ϕ.
The third phase expands the state space of U by adding a counter d ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and a output variable z. Initially d is 0. Whenever a property is violatedd is set to 2. If
d > 0, the shield is in the recovery phase and can deviate. If d = 1 and there is no other
violation, d is decremented to 0. In order to decide when to decrement d from 2 to 1,
we add an output z to the shield. If this output is set to true and d = 2, then d is set to 1.
The final violation monitor isU = (U,u0, Σu, δu), with the set of states U = (2Q ×
{0, 1, 2}), the initial state u0 = ({q0}, 0), the input/output alphabet Σu = ΣI × ΣuO with
ΣuO = ΣO ∪ z, and the next-state function δu , which obeys the following rules:
1. δu((u, d), (σI, σO)) =
(
{q′∈W | ∃q ∈ u, σO′ ∈ ΣuO . δ(q, (σI, σO′)) = q′}, 2
)
if ∀q ∈ u . δ(q, (σI, σO)) <W, and
2. δu((u, d), σ) =
(
{q′ ∈W | ∃q ∈ u . δ(q, σ) = q′},dec(d)
)
if ∃q ∈ u . δ(q, σ) ∈W, and
dec(0) = dec(1) = 0, and if z is true then dec(2) = 1, else dec(2) = 2.
Our construction sets d = 2 whenever the design leaves the winning region, and not
when it enters an unsafe state. Hence, the shield S can take a remedial action as soon
as “the crime is committed”, before the damage is detected, which would have been too
late to correct the erroneous outputs of the design.
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Fig. 5: Safety automaton of Example 1.
t0 t1
σo , σ′o
σo = σ′o
σo = σ′o σo , σ′o
Fig. 6: The deviation monitor T .
Table 1: δu ofU of Example 1.
¬o1¬o2 ¬o1o2 or o1¬o2 o1o2
{F} {F} {F,S} {S}
{S} {T} {T} {T}
{T} {F} {F} {F}
{F,S} {F} {F,S,T} {S,T}
{S,T} {F,T} {F,T} {F,T}
{F,T} {F} {F,S,T} {F,S}
{F,S,T} {F} {F,S,T} {F,S,T}
Example 1. We illustrate the construction ofU using the specification ϕ from Fig. 5
over the outputs o1 and o2. (Fig. 5 represents a safety automaton if we make all missing
edges point to an (additional) unsafe state.) The winning region consists of all safe
states, i.e., W = {F,S,T}. The resulting violation monitor isU = ({F,S,T,FS,ST,FT,
FST} × {0, 1, 2}, (F, 0), Σu, δu). The transition relation δu is illustrated in Table 1 and
lists the next states for all possible present states and outputs. Lightning bolts denote
specification violations. The update of counter d, which is not included in Table 1, is as
follows: Whenever the design commits a violation d is set to 2. If no violation exists, d
is decremented in the following way: if d = 1 or d = 0, d is set to 0. If d = 2 and z is
true, d is set to 1, else d remains 2. In this example, z is set to true, whenever we are
positive about the current state of the design (i.e. in ({F}, d), ({S}, d), and ({T}, d)).
Let us take a closer look at some entries of Table 1. If the current state is ({F}, 0)
and we observe the output ¬o2o1, a specification violation occurs. We assume that D
meant to give an allowed output, either o2o1 or ¬o2¬o1. The shield continues to monitor
both F and S; thus,U enters the state ({F,S}, 2). If the next observation is o2o1, which is
allowed from both possible current states, the possible next states are S and T, therefore
U traverses to state ({S,T}, 2). However, if the next observation is again ¬o2o1, which
is neither allowed in F nor in S, we know that a second violation occurs. Therefore, the
shield monitors the design from all three states andU enters the state ({F,S,T}, 2).
Step 2. Constructing the Deviation Monitor T . We build T = (T, t0, ΣO × ΣO, δt)
to monitor deviations between the shield and design outputs. Here, T = {t0, t1} and
δt(t, (σO, σO′)) = t0 iff σO = σO′. That is, if there is a deviation in the current time step,
then T will be in t1 in the next time step. Otherwise, it will be in t0. This deviation
monitor is shown in Fig. 6.
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Step 3. Constructing and Solving the Safety Game Gs. Given the automata U and
T and the safety automaton ϕ, we construct a safety game Gs = (Gs, gs0, ΣsI , ΣsO δs,Fs),
which is the synchronous product of U, T , and ϕ, such that Gs = U × T × Q is the
state space, gs0 = (u0, t0, q0) is the initial state, Σ
s
I = ΣI × ΣO is the input of the shield,
ΣsO = ΣO ∪ {z} is the output of the shield, δs is the next-state function, and Fs is the set
of safe states such that δs
(
(u, t, q), (σI, σO), (σO′, z)
)
=(
δu[u, (σI, (σO, z))], δt[t, (σO, σO′)], δ[q, (σI, σO′)]
)
,
and Fs = {(u, t, q) ∈ Gs | q ∈ F ∧ u = (w, 0)→ t = t0}.
We require q ∈ F, which ensures that the output of the shield satisfies ϕ, and that the
shield can only deviate in the recovery period (i.e., if d = 0, no deviation is allowed). We
use standard algorithms for safety games (cf. [11]) to compute the winning region Ws
and the most permissive non-deterministic winning strategy ρs : G × ΣI → 2ΣO that is
not only winning for the system, but also contains all deterministic winning strategies.
Step 4. Constructing the Bu¨chi Game Gb. Implementing the safety game ensures
correctness (D◦S |= ϕ) and that the shield S keeps the output of the designD intact, if
D does not violate ϕ. The shield still has to keep the number of deviations per violation
to a minimum. Therefore, we would like the recovery period to be over infinitely often.
This can be formalized as a Bu¨chi winning condition. We construct the Bu¨chi game Gb
by applying the non-deterministic safety strategy ρs to the game graph Gs.
Given the safety game Gs = (Gs, gs0, ΣsI , ΣsO, δs,Fs) with the non-deterministic win-
ning strategy ρs and the winning regionWs, we construct a Bu¨chi gameGb = (Gb, gb0, ΣsI ,
ΣsO, δ
b,Fb) such that Gb = Ws is the state space, the initial state gb0 = g
s
0 and the in-
put/output alphabet ΣbI = Σ
s
I and Σ
b
O = Σ
s
O remain unchanged, δ
b = δs ∩ ρs is the
transition function, and Fb = {(u, t, q) ∈ Ws | (u = (w, 0) ∨ u = (w, 1))} is the set of
accepting states. A play is winning if d ≤ 1 infinitely often.
Step 5. Solving the Bu¨chi Game Gb. Most likely, the Bu¨chi game Gb contains reach-
able states, for which d ≤ 1 cannot be enforced infinitely often. We implement an
admissible strategy that enforces to visit d ≤ 1 infinitely often whenever possible. This
criterion essentially asks for a strategy that is winning with the help of the design.
The admissible strategy ρb for a Bu¨chi game Gb = (Gb, gb0, ΣbI , ΣbO, δb,Fb) can be
computed as follows[11]:
1. Compute the winning region Wb and a winning strategy ρbw for Gb (cf. [19]).
2. Remove all transitions that start in Wb and do not belong to ρbw from Gb. This
results in a new Bu¨chi game Gb1 = (Gb, gb0, ΣbI , ΣbO, δb1,Fb) with (g, (σI, σO), g′) ∈ δb1
if (g, σI, σO) ∈ ρbw or if ∀σO′ ∈ ΣbO .(g, σI, σO′) < ρbw ∧ (g, (σI, σO), g′) ∈ δb.
3. In the resulting game Gb1, compute a cooperatively winning strategy ρb. In order to
compute ρb, one first has to transform all input variables to output variables. This
results in the Bu¨chi game Gb2 = (Gb, gb0, ∅, ΣbI × ΣbO, δb1,Fb). Afterwards, ρb can be
computed with the standard algorithm for the winning strategy on Gb2.
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The strategy ρb is an admissible strategy of the game Gb, since it is winning and
cooperatively winning [11]. Whenever the game Gb starts in a state of the winning
region Wb, any play created by ρbw is winning. Since ρb coincides with ρbw in all states
of the winning region Wb, ρb is winning. We know that ρb is cooperatively winning in
the game Gb1. A proof that ρb is also cooperatively winning in the original game Gb can
be found in [11].
Theorem 1. A shield that implements the admissible strategy ρb in the Bu¨chi game
Gb = (Gb, gb0, ΣbI , ΣbO, δb,Fb) in a new reactive system S = (Gb, gb0, ΣbI , ΣbO, δ′, ρb) with
δ′(g, σI) = δb(g, σI, ρb(g, σI)) is an admissible shield.
Proof 1 First, the admissible strategy ρb is winning for all winning states of the Bu¨chi
game Gb. Since winning strategies for Bu¨chi games are subgame optimal, a shield that
implements ρb ends deviations after the smallest number of steps possible, for all states
of the design in which a finite number of deviations can be guaranteed. Second, ρb is
cooperatively winning in the Bu¨chi game Gb. Therefore, in all states in which a finite
number of deviation cannot be guaranteed, a shield that implements the strategy ρb
recovers with the help of the design as soon as possible.
The standard algorithm for solving Bu¨chi games contains the computation of at-
tractors; the i-th attractor for the system contains all states from which the system can
“force” a visit of an accepting state in i steps. For all states g ∈ Gb of the game Gb,
the attractor number of g corresponds to the smallest number of steps within which the
recovery phase can be guaranteed to end, or can end with the help of the design if a
finite number of deviation cannot be guaranteed.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ = {Q, q0, Σ, δ, F} be a safety specification and |Q| be the cardinality
of the state space of ϕ. An admissible shield with respect to ϕ can be synthesized in
O(2|Q|) time, if it exists.
Proof 2 Our safety game Gs and our Bu¨chi game Gb have at most m = (2 · 2|Q| + |Q|) ·
2 · |Q| states and at most n = m2 edges. Safety games can be solved in O(m + n) time
and Bu¨chi games in O(m · n) time [19].
6 Experimental Results
We implemented our admissible shield synthesis procedure in Python, which takes a
set of safety automata defined in a textual representation as input. The first step in our
synthesis procedure is to build the product of all safety automata and construct the vio-
lation monitor 5. This step is performed on an explicit representation. For the remaining
steps we use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) for symbolic representation. The syn-
thesized shields are encoded in Verilog format. To evaluate the performance of our tool,
we constructed three sets of experiments, the basis of which is the safety specification
of Fig. 1. This example represents a map with 15 waypoints and the six safety properties
1-6. First, we reduced the complexity of the example by only considering 8 out of 15
waypoints. This new example, called Map8, consists of the waypoints loc1 to loc8 with
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Table 2: Results of map8 and map31.
Example Property |Q| |I| |O| l Time [sec]
Map8 1 9 0 3 3 0.52
1+4 12 0 3 3 1.2
1+5a 46 1 3 4 6.2
1+5b 32 1 3 3 7
1+4+5a 55 1 3 4 17
1+4+5b 36 1 3 3 12
Map31 1 32 0 5 6 122
Map31 1+2 32 0 5 6 143
Map31 1+2+3 34 0 5 6 183
Map31 1+2+3+4 38 0 5 6 238
Table 3: Results of map15.
Example Property |Q| |I| |O| l Time [sec]
Map15 1 16 0 4 5 12
1+2 16 0 4 5 14
1+2+3 19 0 4 5 19
1+2+3+4 23 0 4 5 28
1+5a 84 1 4 6 173
1+5a+2 84 1 4 6 205
1+5a+2+3 100 1 4 6 307
1+5b 64 1 4 6 169
1+5b+2 64 1 4 6 195
1+6 115 1 4 7 690
their corresponding properties. The second series of experiments, called Map15, con-
siders the original specification of Fig. 1 over all 15 waypoints. The synthesized shields
behave as described in Section 2. The third series of experiments, called Map31, con-
siders a map with 31 waypoints, essentially adding a duplicate of the map in Fig. 1. All
results are summarized in Table 2 and in Table 3. For both tables, the first columns list
the set of specification automata and the number of states, inputs, and outputs of their
product automata. The next column lists the smallest number of steps l under which
the shield is able to recover with the help of the design. The last column lists the syn-
thesis time in seconds. All computation times are for a computer with a 2.6 GHz Intel
i5-3320M CPU with 8 GB RAM running an 64-bit distribution of Linux. Source code,
input files, and instructions to reproduce our experiments are available for download1.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a new shield synthesis procedure to synthesize admissible shields.
We have shown that admissible shields overcome the limitations of previously devel-
oped k-stabilizing shields. We believe our approach and first experimental results over
our case study involving UAV mission planning open several directions for future re-
search. At the moment, shields only attend to safety properties and disregard liveness
properties. Integrating liveness is therefore a preferable next step. Furthermore, we plan
to further develop our prototype tool and apply shields in other domains such as in
the distributed settings or for Safe Reinforcement Learning, in which safety constraints
must be enforced during the learning processes. We plan to investigate how a shield
might be most beneficial in such settings.
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